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Abstract: This study examines the association between family ownership and financial 
information transparency of large corporations in the Asian region and whether 
independent oversight (i.e., independent directors and external auditors) influences 
such relationship. The transparency of financial information is measured using 
earnings’ opacity which includes three dimensions, i.e., profit aggressiveness, loss 
avoidance, and income smoothing. The findings show a positive association between 
family ownership and financial information transparency. Further, we find that both 
independent director and external auditors negatively influence the relationship 
between family ownership and financial information transparency. Firms with a 
higher percentage of family ownership tend to have a weaker role of board 
independence, which leads to less transparent financial information. Lastly, external 
auditors also seem to have limited power in reducing earnings opacity in family firms.  
Keywords: financial information transparency, earnings’ opacity, family ownership, 
board independence, external auditors 
 
Intisari: Studi ini meneliti hubungan antara kepemilikan keluarga dan transparansi 
informasi keuangan perusahaan besar di kawasan Asia dan apakah pengawasan 
independen (yaitu, direktur independen dan auditor eksternal) memengaruhi 
hubungan semacam itu. Transparansi informasi keuangan diukur menggunakan 
opacity laba yang mencakup tiga dimensi, yaitu, agresivitas laba, penghindaran 
kerugian, dan perataan laba. Temuan menunjukkan hubungan positif antara 
kepemilikan keluarga dan transparansi informasi keuangan. Lebih lanjut, kami 
menemukan bahwa direktur independen dan auditor eksternal berpengaruh negatif 
terhadap hubungan antara kepemilikan keluarga dan transparansi informasi 
keuangan. Perusahaan dengan persentase kepemilikan keluarga yang lebih tinggi 
cenderung memiliki peran independensi dewan yang lebih lemah, yang mengarah 
pada informasi keuangan yang kurang transparan. Terakhir, auditor eksternal juga 
tampaknya memiliki kekuatan terbatas dalam mengurangi opacity pendapatan di 
perusahaan keluarga. 
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Kata Kunci: Transparansi informasi keuangan, opacity pendapatan, kepemilikan 
keluarga, independensi dewan, auditor eksternal 
 
1. Introduction 
The Corruption Perception Index report from 2012 to 2014 shows that 95% of 
Asian countries tend to have low levels of information transparency. Companies with 
concentrated ownership, particularly in the hand of families, are often linked with 
lower transparency of financial information (Anderson et al., 2009). Firms with a 
higher proportion of family ownership tend to have a lower level of earnings quality 
and a higher level of earnings management (Fung et al., 2013; Jaggi et al., 2009), 
which seems to potentially encourage family firms to limit the information presented 
to shareholders and the public. These conditions resulted in the poor transparency of 
corporate information, particularly in countries with relatively weak minority investor 
protection (Lang et al., 2012). The opposite view is shown by Nordin & Hussin (2009) 
who find that family firms in Malaysia tend to disclose more transparent information 
to the public. Wang (2006) also find that family firms tend to provide a better quality 
of earnings. The different findings could be explained by the different view of 
transparency in family firms, due to entrenchment and alignment effects (Nordin & 
Hussin, 2009; Srinidhi et al., 2014; Wang, 2006). The entrenchment effect explains 
how family firms are driven to improve financial statement information by taking 
opportunistic measures, such as management profit (Wang, 2006). Whereas, the effect 
of alignment shows how family firms deliver better information quality to protect the 
company's reputation and future performance. 
Family firms may suffer from a conflict of interest, particularly through conflicts 
between majority and minority shareholders (i.e., agency conflicts type II) (Ali et al., 
2007; Atmaja et al., 2011; Srinidhi et al., 2014). One way to mitigate this type II 
agency conflict is through the role of independent oversight both within and outside 
the company (Leung et al., 2014), which involves independent directors and external 
auditors (Fan & Wong, 2005; Ianniello, 2013; Leung et al., 2014). Both roles are 
believed to be able to mitigate the type II agency conflicts (Fan & Wong, 2005; 
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Atmaja et al., 2011; Srinidhi et al., 2014). The independent oversight is not impartial 
to the management, and this could provide better protection to the minority 
shareholders (Fan & Wong, 2005; Atmaja et al., 2011; Srinidhi et al., 2014).  
However, the results of previous studies on the link between independent 
oversight and financial transparency in family firms are not always consistent. 
Independent directors can improve the performance of family enterprises by providing 
effective oversight, unbiased advice, and directing management. Moreover, the high 
proportion of independent directors of commissioners proved effective in reducing 
opportunistic measures (Atmaja et al., 2011; Leung et al., 2014). In contrast, other 
research finds that the role and proportion of independent directors are less effective in 
improving the transparency and quality of earnings of family firms (Jaggi et al., 2009; 
Nordin & Hussin, 2009). Family firms view independent directors as a disruption that 
can hamper the decision-making process and potentially threaten the powers of 
founding family members (Leung et al., 2014).  
Further, external auditors also serve an important role as the external oversight 
function of the company. External auditor with higher reputation tends to decrease the 
entrenchment effect and increase information transparency of family enterprise (Fan & 
Wong, 2005; Lang et al., 2012). Srinidhi et al. (2014) show that the selection of 
qualified auditors by family firms is positively associated with higher transparency of 
financial reporting, higher quality of earnings information and lower audit risk. The 
findings are in contrast to the results of Zuhrohtun & Baridwan's (2015) study which 
found that qualified auditors are not able to detect fraud by majority owners, thus 
unable to improve information transparency. 
Based on the above discussion, within the context of firms in Asia, this study 
investigates the following research questions: (1) what is the relationship between 
family ownership and financial information transparency? (2) Is independent oversight 
moderates the relationship between family ownership and financial information 
transparency? This study complements previous research on the transparency of 
financial information on different types of ownership. We measure financial 
information transparency by using earnings opacity (Bhattacharya et al., 2003).  
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This study provides some findings. First, we find a positive association between 
family ownership and financial information transparency. Second, firms with a higher 
proportion of independent directors tend to have a lower level of financial information 
transparency. Third, the type of external auditors (i.e., Big 4 auditors) in family firms 
are associated with lower level of financial information transparency.  
 
2. Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development 
2.1   Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory  
Jensen & Meckling (1976) defines agency relations as a contract between 
principal and agent to fulfill principal interests. In such relationship, conflict of 
interest arises when one of them pursue self-interest. The conflict between the 
principal and the agent is known as the Type I agency conflict (Srinidhi et al., 2014). 
Meanwhile, conflicts of interest in family firms occur mostly between majority and 
minority shareholders, which is known as the Type II agency conflict (Leung et al., 
2014; Srinidhi et al., 2014).  
Stewardship theory, on the other hand, explains how a manager is not merely 
motivated to achieve an individual goal, but rather to maintain (steward) his 
motivational alignment with the goals of the company owner (Davis et al., 1997). At 
the family enterprise, owners and managers tend to have an aligned interest (Chu, 
2011) and tend to have lower self-interest/opportunism. As a consequence, family 
firms tend to have a better quality of financial information resulting in more 
transparent information (Ali et al., 2007; Nordin & Hussin, 2009; Wang, 2006). 
  
2.2  Family Ownership and Transparency of Financial Information  
Transparency in a company is defined as the availability of company-specific 
information presented publicly (Bushman et al., 2004). Further, financial transparency 
is interpreted as more specific information to show the intensity and timeliness of 
financial disclosure by companies, interpretation of financial information by analysts 
and the dissemination of financial information by electronic media. As family firms 
tend to have better alignment of interests, firms tend to provide financial information 
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that will be more transparent to the public, have lower levels of earnings management, 
higher earnings quality and greater disclosure (Ali et al., 2007; Atmaja et al. , 2011; 
Nordin & Hussin, 2009; Wang, 2006). Wang's (2006) study proves that family 
ownership is positively related to the quality of financial information. In line with the 
argument, Srinidhi et al. (2014) find that family firms tend to have a higher quality of 
financial information. Anderson et al. (2009) also prove that ownership by founders 
and descendants of the founders become effective organizational structures in the 
corporate environment when the law governing investor protection is strong enough, 
and the information flaw in the company tends to be low. 
Family firms in the United States signal that family control is used to limit 
corporate information disclosure to the public (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Srinidhi et 
al., 2014; Wang, 2006). However, unlike Asian countries where family ownership is a 
dominant form of organization and does not necessarily signify that family members 
have control over the company (Leung et al., 2012). Family firms can present more 
transparent information, high transparency in financial reporting by family firms or 
high investor demand for personal information will be useful and beneficial to the 
company itself (Nordin & Hussin, 2009; Nguyen, 2011). Family firms with a high 
proportion of family ownership tend to choose efficient earnings management that is 
like increasing informed earnings in order to communicate personal information to the 
public (Siregar & Utama, 2008). The results of the study in Asia illustrates that the 
high level of transparency by family firms because family companies still need capital 
support from external investors. Family firms that require capital from external parties 
should present more specific corporate information to investors. Also, family 
ownership is an effective form of ownership in Asia capable of presenting relatively 
transparent financial information and lowering opportunistic measures. 
H1: Family firms will have a higher level of financial information transparency.  
2.3  Family Ownership, Independent Director, and Financial Information 
Transparency 
This study defines independent directors as independent management who 
provide checks and balances; they are expected to supervise and control the self-
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serving actions of non-independent directors over the interests of external shareholders 
(Nordin & Hussin, 2009). The governance mechanisms supported by the strong 
function of independent directors tend to decrease agency conflict type II in family 
firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Atmaja et al., 2011; Srinidhi et al., 2014). The results 
of Anderson & Reeb's (2004) study indicate that independent directors have a 
potential role as moderators between the relationship of family members in the 
company and the decrease of conflict between groups of shareholders. According to 
Leung et al. (2014), independent directors provide fairly strict supervision of 
managerial behavior, therefore the higher the proportion of independent directors, the 
higher the quality of financial information of the company. Atmaja et al. (2011) find 
that a high proportion of independent directors in family firms effectively reduces 
opportunistic actions through enhanced oversight mechanisms over company 
operations and can weaken family ownership and earnings management relationships. 
The ability of board independence in reducing agency conflict type II and decreasing 
opportunistic actions in family firms suggests the effectiveness of his role in 
overseeing all kinds of deviant actions and supporting the creation of transparency in 
the company.  
H2: Board independence moderates the relationship between family ownership and 
financial information transparency. 
 
2.4   Family Ownership, External Auditor, and Transparency of Financial Information 
External auditors, as independent oversight to the firm, also plays a vital role as 
part of governance mechanisms. Thus they are expected to improve the quality of 
corporate reporting (Ianniello, 2013). According to Davidson & Neu (1993), a quality 
audit is demonstrated by the auditor's ability to detect and eliminate errors and 
manipulations in reporting net income. Fan & Wong (2005) proves that qualified 
external auditors can improve corporate governance mechanisms and reduce agency 
conflicts in firms with concentrated ownership. 
Furthermore, Ianniello (2013) points out that qualified auditors can also enhance 
the protection of outside investors' equity and provide better protection to 
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shareholders, particularly minority shareholders. Lang et al. (2012) find that firms 
which are audited by external auditors with a higher reputation tend to have more 
transparent financial information. Srinidhi et al. (2014) reinforce previous research 
evidence indicating that family ownership relations and financial information quality 
are stronger when firms choose qualified auditors. Accordingly, the following research 
question is proposed: 
H3: The type of external auditors moderates the relationship between family 
ownership and financial information transparency. 
 
3. Research Methods  
3.1   Data  
Data on information transparency, board independence, external auditors and 
family ownership are obtained from financial reports downloaded from the OSIRIS 
database. This study uses data from four countries in Asia with the selected research 
year is 2012 to 2014. Four Asian countries are selected to represent countries with a 
higher level of transparency (i.e., Japan and Singapore) and lower level of 
transparency (i.e., Indonesia and the Philippines). Based on non-financial companies 
which have a financial year ending on December 31, 217 family firms meet sampling 
criteria, resulting in a total of 651 firm-years during 2012-2014. 
 
3.2  Measurement of Research Variables 
Financial Information Transparency 
Financial information transparency is measured using earnings’ opacity. 
Transparency of financial information according to Qian et al. (2014) is the opposite 
of earnings’ opacity. The degree of earnings’ opacity in a country represents a failure 
of the state in distributing corporate earnings’ reporting and the truth over the 
distribution of information, but can not be observed in a firm's economic profit in a 
country (Bhattacharya et al., 2003). There are three dimensions of profit opacity 
measurement, namely profit aggressiveness, loss avoidance, and income smoothing. 
The first dimension, i.e., profit aggressiveness is measured using accrual (earnings 
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aggressiveness). There is a possibility that managers are compelled to report more 
favorable profits than under-serving. So the aggressive profit is a blurry profit because 
the accounting report is more likely to reflect biased and optimistic reporting from the 
management side, also add to the error in the reported earnings, therefore, can increase 
the opacity of profit. Here is the accrual calculation formula used by Bhattacharya et 
al. (2003):  
 
𝑨𝑪𝑪𝑹𝑼𝑨𝑳 = (∆𝑪𝑨 − ∆𝑪𝑳 − ∆𝑪𝑨𝑺𝑯+ ∆𝑺𝑻𝑫 − 𝑫𝑬𝑷+ ∆𝑻𝑷)/
𝒍𝒂𝒈(𝑻𝑨).........(EQ1) 
 
With:  
ΔCA = Changes in the current asset, i.e., the total current asset of year t minus total current assets 
of year t-1.  
ΔCL  = Changes in current liabilities, i.e., total CL of year t minus total CL of year t-1.  
ΔCASH  = Changes in cash, i.e., cash in year t minus cash in year t-1.  
ΔSTD  = Change in short-term debt, i.e., the portion of long-term debt maturing in year t minus year 
t-1.  
DEP  = Depreciation and amortization expense in year t.  
ΔTP  = Changes of tax payable, i.e., tax payable in year t minus tax payable in year t-1.  
Lag (TA)  = Total assets of year t-1 
 
The second dimension of opacity is loss avoidance. Bhattacharya et al. (2003) 
define firms that have a small positive profit (small negative earnings) is a company 
with net income divided by total assets t-1 is valued between 0 to 1 percent (0 to -1 
percent). The ratio of the number of firms with small positive profits minus the 
number of companies with a small profit negatively divided by the total company for 
each year. The higher the ratio value in a country in year t shows the higher the 
avoidance loss. 
The third dimension, i.e., income smoothing, is measured using the correlation 
between accrual change divided by total assets t-1 and changes in cash flows divided 
by total assets of t-1antar companies in year t (Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Leuzet al, 
2003; Qian et al., 2014). An increasingly negative correlation indicates a greater 
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likelihood of income smoothing in a country that covers the variability in economic 
performance and is greater for profitability.  
The value of opacity of earnings is derived from the average of three dimensions 
for each country in year t. In this study, it was not done by rating 1 to 10 as in 
Bhattacharya et al. (2003); Qian et al. (2014); Zuhrohtun & Baridwan (2015). This is 
because the researchers did not test the effect of each dimension on family ownership 
as well as the distance of the study year is very short. Ranking primarily for the 
dimension of loss avoidance and income smoothing is not varied and inefficient, due 
to the presence of the same final value for each firm per year per country. Moreover, 
because profit opacity is the opposite of financial information transparency, the value 
of profit blurriness will be multiplied -1 to obtain the value of transparency of 
financial information. 
 
Family Ownership  
The family company category refers to Anderson & Reeb (2003) and Wang 
(2006) explaining that a company is categorized as a family company if the founder or 
founding family owns the stock in the company and founding family members 
becomes part of the board of commissioners or top management. Second, family 
ownership is measured by the percentage of common stock ownership by founding 
family members, with the largest percentage showing the high level of family interest 
in the enterprise. 
 
Board Independence and External Auditor  
Board independence is measured by the ratio of independent directors by the total 
number of board members per company (Atmaja et al., 2011; Marraet al., 2011). The 
external auditor is measured using dummy variables, with “1” for companies audited 
by Big4 auditor and “0” otherwise. The control variables used in this research are 
SIZE, LEVERAGE, MBV (market to book value ratio), ADJROA, IP (investor 
protection), AS (accounting standard), and dummy years (i.e., 2013 and 2014). 
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Research Model  
The first hypothesis deals with the relationship of family ownership with the 
transparency of financial information. Here is a research model for hypothesis 1. 
 
TIFit = β0 + β1Famit+ β2SIZEit +β3LEVit + β4MBVit+ β5ADJROAit + β6IPit + 
β7ASit+ β8D2012it  + β9D2013it + ɛ ........................(EQ2) 
 
The second and third hypothesis examines the moderating effect of independent 
control of the company. Therefore the equation 3 and 4 below are estimated to test H2 
and H3, respectively: 
 
TIFit = β0 + β1Famit + β2IBit+ β3Famit*IBit + β4SIZEit +β5LEVit + β6MBVit+ 
β7ADJROAit + β8IPit + β9ASit + β10D2012it  + β11D2013it + ɛ 
...................................................................(EQ3) 
 
TIFit = β0 + β1Famit + β2EAit+ β3Famit*EAit + β4SIZEit +β5LEVit + 
β6MBVit+ β7ADJROAit + β8IPit + β9ASit + β10D2012it  + β11D2013it  
+ ɛ ..................................................................(EQ4) 
 
With: 
TIFit  = Transparency of financial information, which is measured using 
earnings opacity, for firm i in year t.  
Famit  = Family ownership, which is the percentage of ownership of common 
stock by the founding family member for company i in year t.  
IBit  = Board independence, which is the ratio of independent directors to the 
total member of the board of commissioner for company i in year t.  
EAit  =  External auditors is measured using a dummy variable, "1" for the 
company audited by auditor Big4 and “0” otherwise.  
SIZEit  = Company size, which is measured using the natural logarithm of total 
assets of firm i in year t.  
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LEVit = Leverage, which is measured using the ratio of total debt divided by 
total assets of firm i in year t.  
MBVit  = Market to Book Value is measured using the ratio of equity market 
value divided by book value of equity of firm i in year t. 
ADJROAit  = Adjusted ROA, which is ROA adjusted and measured using net income 
divided by total assets minus median ROA of the industry of firm I in 
year t. 
IPit =  Investor Protection, which is a dummy variable "1" if the country has 
high investor protection, "0" if the country has low investor protection 
for firm i in year t. (Houqe et al., 2012)  
ASit =  The accounting standard (Accounting Standard) is measured using the 
dummy variable "1" if the country has full IFRS, "0" otherwise. 
D2012it = "1" for 2012, "0" otherwise. 
D20132it = “1” for 2013, “0” otherwise. 
ɛ =  error 
 
4. Result  
4.1.  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample data of this study. The 
dependent variable is the transparency of financial information (TIF) contained in 
panel A shows the average value of -0.097. The independent variable in this study of 
family election (Fam) indicates that the average ownership of common stock by 
founding family members in the four countries amounts to 0.317 or 31.7%. 
Moderating variables (i.e., board independence (IB) indicates that the average family 
company has 36% of independent directors. The second moderating variable, i.e., 
external auditors (Panel B) shows that as many as 63.1% of family companies choose 
Big 4 Auditors. 
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Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics (n=651) 
 
Variable  Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. 
Panel A  (Continuous Variable)    
TIF -0,097 -0,054 6,807 -0,551 0,312 
Fam 0,317 0,263 0,972 0,000 0,259 
IB 0,360 0,333 1,000 0,000 0,316 
SIZE 15,214 15,006 20,014 11,710 1,647 
Total Assets 18.032 3.287 4.920.000 121 51.935 
LEV 0,257 0,241 2,530 0,000 0,219 
ADJROA 0,054 -0,060 76,550 -52,475 8,680 
MBV 1,283 1,015 41,932 -188,357 7,817 
      
Panel B  (Dummy Variable)   
 Dummy 0 Dummy 1  
 N % n %  
EA 240 36,866 411 63,134  
IP 267 41,014 384 58,986  
AS 378 58,064 273 41,936  
 
TIF = transparency of financial information is projected using profit blur that has three 
dimensions of profit aggressiveness, loss avoidance, and income smoothing. The value of 
profit opacity multiplied -1 to obtain the final value of TIF. The higher the TIF value 
indicates the information presented is more transparent and vice versa. Fam = percentage 
of common stock held by family). IB = percentage of independent directors. EA = external 
auditor is an external auditor who is the auditor Big 4. SIZE = company size, the total 
natural logarithm of assets. Total Assets in the table are presented in billions. LEV = 
leverage (debt ratio) .ADJROA = ROA adjustment for industry level (adjusted ROA). 
MBV = equity book value ratio divided by the market to book value. IP = investor 
protection level at country level (Investor Protection) refers to Houqe et al. (2012).AS = 
adoption status of IFRS (Accounting Standard). D 2012 = dummy year (1 = 2012, 0 = 
otherwise), D 2013 = dummy year (1 = 2013, 0 = otherwise). 
 
 
4.2.  Results of Hypotheses Testing 
The first hypothesis states that family ownership has a positive influence on the 
transparency of financial information. Hypothesis testing uses panel pooled model 
data regression. Table 2 (Model 1) shows that family ownership variables are 
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significant at alpha 1% with positive coefficients. Based on these findings the first 
hypothesis in this study is supported. This finding proves that the higher the 
percentage of shares owned by family members the more transparent the financial 
information presented, consistent with the results of Nordin & Hussin's (2009) study. 
The results of this study also indicate that in family firms in Asia, the conflict of 
interest between owner and management (Type I) is relatively low. In line with the 
results of Atmaja et al. (2011) and Wang (2006) research, family members actively 
involved in corporate management will reduce their opportunistic behavior especially 
in limiting financial information to maintain corporate reputation. 
The second hypothesis predicts that the presence of independent directors 
moderates the positive relationship between family ownership and financial 
information transparencydirectors. The result of interaction test of Model 2B in Table 
2 shows that the interaction of family ownership and independent directors (Fam * IB) 
has a positive and insignificant effect. Thus, the second hypothesis is not supported. 
These results indicate that the proportion of independent directors in family firms is 
relatively low in encouraging corporate transparency. These findings are in line with 
those of Nordin & Hussin (2009) and Jaggi et al. (2009) who find that the proportion 
of high independent directors does not play an important role in improving the 
company's performance as well as the transparency of financial information in family 
firms. These findings indicate that in family firms, independent board’ role as 
monitoring mechanisms to reduce agency conflict between majority and minority 
shareholders are ineffective, which could be due to stronger family interventions in 
such firms. In family firms, family members tend to control the reappointment of 
independent directors. Therefore they tend to be less independent, take side with 
family decisions, and less critical to opportunistic action by management (Jaggi et al., 
2009). 
Further, the third hypothesis expects that the quality of the external auditor 
moderates the positive relationship between family ownership and financial 
information transparency. Model 3B (Table 2) shows that the coefficient on the 
interaction of family ownership and external auditor (Fam*AI) is significant in the 
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negative. Thus the third hypothesis is not supported. The finding shows that qualified 
external auditors tend to weaken the have an effect on high corporate opacity and low 
transparency of financial information, highly qualified auditors cannot detect 
opportunistic actions by a family company. In line with the findings of Zuhrohtun & 
Baridwan's research (2015) that qualified auditor differences are not able to reduce the 
level of earnings opacity or the auditor is unable to detect opportunistic management 
actions, i.e., blurring the earnings for personal gain. According to Bhattacharya et al. 
(2003), the earnings opacity by a company is difficult to observe in the firm's 
economic profit, making it clear that there is a qualified external auditor’s inability to 
detect the opacity of profits by a family company. The existence of qualified external 
auditors in companies with a high percentage of family ownership cannot overcome 
the strength of family members' interventions in opportunistic decision making, 
resulting in increased profitability and low transparency of financial information.  
 
4.3  Additional Analysis  
Findings on the main model show that investor protection has a negative effect on 
information transparency, accordingly we the model by using different measurement 
for investor protection variable. Countries with strong investor protection are 
relatively low yielding transparency of information. Consistent with the results of 
Hansen et al. (2015), the level of transparency tends to increase significantly in 
countries with stronger investor protection compared to countries with weaker investor 
protection. However, Jeanjean (2012) argue that the size of investor protection used by 
Houqe et al. (2012) has some limitations. 
Further, it is argued that the measurements developed by Djankov et al. (2008) 
provide an alternative measure of legal protection for minority shareholders against 
corporate expropriation and misuse of corporate assets for personal gain by directors. 
Accordingly, we use the investor protection index of the World Bank Doing Business 
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Database as used by Haidar (2009) based on three dimensions of investor protection 
measures Djankov et al. (2008) 1 in the additional analysis. 
As shown in Table 3, in all models the finding shows that investor protection has 
a significant positive effect on the transparency of financial information on family 
firms in Asia. These results are consistent with Cahan et al. (2008) and Defond et al. 
(2007), which find that firms in a country with stronger investor protection tend to 
have higher information transparency, higher earnings quality, and lower opportunistic 
behaviors, compared to firms that reside in a country with weaker investor protection. 
Thus, the strength of investor protection in a country tend to encourage family firms to 
provide more transparent financial information.  
The findings for Model 1 in Table 3 are still consistent with the previous testing, that 
family ownership affects the high transparency of financial information presented to 
the public as well as to stakeholders. Model 2A shows that board independence has a 
significant positive effect on the transparency of financial information at alpha 1%. 
The findings are also consistent with earlier findings that the proportion of board 
independence is relatively improving the transparency of financial information of 
family firms. However, in contrast to the findings of Model 2B which shows that the 
interaction of the proportion of board independence and the percentage of ownership 
is significant at alpha 1% in a negative direction. The results explain that the 
interaction of the proportion of board independence and the percentage of family 
ownership tends to decrease the transparency of financial information. 
This finding is also in line with the agency theory perspective explaining that the 
effect of family members' involvement is used to maximize personal gain and control 
resources and limit the functionality of board independence. According to Jaggi et al. 
(2009) that the increase in the proportion of board independence to strengthen 
                                                          
1 The data can be accessed on www.doingbusiness.org. The value of the three dimensions of 
investor protection each year and each country is then averaged. Obtaining value above 5.0 is categorized 
as a country with high investor protection and vice versa under 5.0 countries with low investors. Based on 
these new measurements, three countries, namely Singapore, Indonesia, and Japan are categorized as 
countries with strong investor protection which subsequently enter the dummy criterion 1, while the 
Philippines as a country with weak investor protection then goes to dummy criterion 0. 
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supervision tends to be less effective at companies under family control. According to 
him, board independence tends to be disturbed by the existence of family members' 
control either through domination of ownership or reappointment of the board who 
depend on the control of family members. Therefore, there is a tendency of board 
independence to side with family decisions that have an impact on decreasing 
independence, thus increasing the transparency of information is not achieved. Further 
test results for Model 3A and Model 3B are still consistent with previous findings that 
external auditors as moderators weaken family ownership relationships and 
transparency of financial information. Qualified external auditors have difficulty in 
detecting the opacity of profits by family firms when the percentage of family 
ownership is high. 
 
5. Conclusion, Implications, and Limitations 
5.1   Conclusion 
This study aims to examine the relationship of family ownership and 
transparency of financial information to firms in Asia. The results show that 
the percentage of common stock ownership by founding family members can 
improve the transparency of financial information. Family firms in Asia also 
tend to avoid agency conflicts between principals and agents (Type I). 
This research also adds the moderating effect of independent supervision, i.e., 
board independence and external auditors. The findings show that board independence 
has a vital role to play in the transparency of financial information in family 
enterprises. However, when the percentage of family ownership is higher, the 
oversight function of board independence declines. This could be due to the stronger 
control or intervention by family members, resulting in a decrease in financial 
information transparency. Further, the presence of independent directors in companies 
with a higher percentage of family ownership may be unable to reduce the conflict of 
interest between majority and minority shareholders (Type II agency conflict). 
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Furthermore, our findings indicate that a more reputable external auditors are unable 
to reduce the earnings opacity in family firms.  
5.2  Implications 
       This study provides some implications. First, the type of enterprise 
concentrated under family ownership in Asia tends to be effective in improving 
the transparency of financial information. Family firms can avoid Type I 
agency conflicts, but can not avoid agency conflict Type II. A higher 
percentage of family ownership tends to lead in the ineffective role of 
independent oversight of both internal and external companies. Companies 
with higher family ownership could be trapped in higher control/intervention 
by family members in making decisions, thus weaken independent supervision 
by independent directors and external auditors. The lack of independent 
oversight makes family firms give priority to family interests as majority 
parties rather than minorities. Further, a lower level of information 
transparency is mostly shown by family firms with small sizes. Lastly, strong 
investor protection in a country can encourage companies to increase the 
transparency of their financial information. 
5.3   Limitations and Suggestions for Future Studies 
This study has some limitations which provide avenues for future studies. First, 
this study only covers three years period. Future studies may extend the period to 
achieve a more comprehensive picture of earnings’ opacity in a country. Second, this 
study measures financial information transparency by using earnings' oppression. 
Subsequent research may add variations in the proxy for financial information 
transparency, such as disclosure. Third, the measurement of family ownership in this 
study is based solely on the percentage of common stock ownership by founding 
family members. Subsequent research may create a percentage category of common 
stock ownership by family members, such as ownership categories above 20% or 50% 
which represent control over corporate decisions. Fourth, the quality of external 
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auditors in this study is categorized based on Big4 and Non-Big4. Future research may 
include the size of external auditors, such as audit fees to demonstrate auditor risk.  
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Table 2 Regression Result – TIF and Family Ownership 
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Table 3 Additional Tests – Alternative Measurement for Investor Protection  
 
N = 651 
Without Moderation Moderator: Board Independence Moderator: External Auditor 
Model 1 Model 2A Model 2B Model 3A Model 3B 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef.  t-stat 
Intercept -0,336 -8,635*** -0,340 -9,053*** -0,397 -10,488*** -0,353 -9,573*** -0,339 -8,723*** 
Fam 0,188 16,821*** 0,205 20,389*** 0,280 15,283*** 0,180 16,401*** 0,245 12,316*** 
IB   0,085 12,429*** 0,137 12,416***     
EA       -0,021 -3,865*** 0,029 2,877*** 
Fam*IB     -0.184 -5,817***     
Fam*EA         -0,145 -6,295*** 
SIZE -0,009 -5,992*** -0,008 -5,479*** -0,006 -4,378*** -0,007 -4,740*** -0,009 -4,888*** 
LEV 0,235 16,505*** 0,201 15,647*** 0,202 15,010*** 0,234 15,859*** 0,216 13,316*** 
ADJROA 0,000 0,946 0,000 1,042 0,000 1,176 0,000 0,249 -0,001 -1,382 
MBV 0,002 6,178*** 0,002 5,951*** 0,002 5,415*** 0,002 7,214*** 0,002 7,207*** 
IP_2 0,247 10,162*** 0,204 8,342*** 0,209 8,382*** 0,242 10,077*** 0,229 9,899*** 
AS 0,072 12,149*** 0,052 8,984*** 0,046 8,040*** 0,079 12,475*** 0,080 12,036*** 
D2012 0,035 6,508*** 0,036 9,062*** 0,039 8,562*** 0,035 6,119*** 0,023 3,954*** 
D2013 0,003 0,700 0,003 0,802 0,003 0,653 0,005 0,957 -0,006 -0,971 
Highest VIF 1,414 
0,572 
0,566 
95,406 
p < 0,000 
1,769 
0,666 
0,661 
127,599 
p < 0,000 
3,808 
0.666 
0,660 
115,770 
p < 0,000 
1,437 
0,587 
0,581 
91,017 
p < 0,000 
3,905 
0,529 
0,521 
65,399 
p < 0,000 
R-squared 
Adj. R-squared 
F-stat 
Prob 
The average financial information transparency (TIF) of the three dimensions of profit opacity (earnings aggressiveness, loss avoidance, and income smoothing) multiplied 
(-1). Family ownership (Fam) is the percentage of ownership of common stock of founding family members. Board independence (IB) is the percentage of an independent 
board. The external auditor (EA) is measured using dummy variables (1 for auditors Big 4, 0 for others). SIZE is the total natural logarithm of the asset. Leverage (LEV) is 
the debt ratio. Adjusted ROA (ADJROA) is a ROA adjustment for industry level. Market to book value (MBV) is the ratio of book value of equity divided by the market 
value of equity. Investor Protection (IP) refers to Haidar (2009). Accounting Standard (AS) is measured using dummy variables (1 for fully IFRS adopting countries, 0 for 
others). D 2012 = dummy year (1 = 2012, 0 = other year), D 2013 = dummy year (1 = 2013, 0 = other year). ***, **, * significance coefficients at 1%, 5% and 10% 
